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Many economists and others argue that theproper solution to water allocation is toallow markets to play the major role in
reallocating water among users and in other aspects
of water management (Anderson and Snyder 1997;
Easter, Rosengrant, and Dinar 1998; Gray 1996;
Kaiser 1996; Sterne 1997; Teerink and Nakashima
1993; Thompson 1993). They argue that private
property and markets are nearly painless means for
resolving the increasing problems of water allocation,
distribution, and preservation. Elsewhere I have
argued at length against this conclusion (Dellapenna
2000). I summarize the reasons for these conclusions
here.
That many professional economists champion
private property and markets (or “market-like
mechanisms”) as water management tools is only
to be expected. The study and employment of
markets is, at least in western economics, their
stock in trade. Markets, they tell us, will introduce
the necessary flexibility into water management
while simultaneously fitting the appropriate
integration of water quality and water quantity
issues into a single managerial model. They also
expect that the market results will be accorded
the strong presumption of validity that market-
based allocations are accorded in capitalist
societies. The presumption of validity for market
outcomes has only been strengthened by the utter
failure of classic socialism. Still, actual markets
in free-flowing water have always been extremely
rare in practice (Israel and Lund 1995; Kloezen
1998; McCormick 1994).
In fact, when markets for water become a subject
of public concern, the debate often becomes highly
emotional, a good deal of the emotion going against
markets (Woodhouse 2003). To the extent that
markets for water have existed, they have been for
the transfer fairly small-scale amounts among similar
users (Kloezen 1998; Thompson 1993). Water
markets have seldom been used to accomplish
significant changes in the ways water is used. Yet,
in the face of the existing and impending
hydropolitical stresses on water management
regimes, this is precisely the sort of change that will
become necessary. When so-called markets are set
up in order to bring about major changes in the time,
place, or manner of use, they in fact have functioned
only through the rather heavy-handed intervention
of the state (Dellapenna 2000; Pigram 1997). Such
arrangements hardly qualify as a market at all.
If markets for water are so good, why are they
so seldom used? Supporters of markets seldom
address this question except to denigrate their critics
as holding cultural, religious, even mystical prejudices
about water (Brown 1995). This attitude, however,
overlooks that water is not like other resources.
Water as a Public Good
Water is not only one of our most essential
resources, it has also long been considered as the
quintessential “public good.” Even market
fundamentalists, who would solve nearly every
problem by recourse to markets, customarily use
water metaphors to discuss public goods on those
rare occasions when they concede that such goods
exist: “common pool resource,” “spill over effects,”
and so on. Only consideration of the possibility of
setting up real markets for water in large quantities
demonstrates the wisdom of treating water as a
public good.
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“Public goods” share two qualities: indivisibility
and publicness (Cowan 1992; Kaul, Grunberg, and
Stern 1999). Indivisibility means that goods cannot
be divided among the consuming public so as to allow
some consumers access to the resource while
excluding other potential consumers. Publicness
means that the resource is shared freely (if not
equally) among the group—consumption by one
person does not, at least under most circumstances,
interfere with consumption by others. Because a
good is indivisible, one cannot simply divide it up and
buy as much as one wants, and because it is public,
one cannot keep others from accessing and enjoying
the good so long as it is accessible and enjoyable by
anyone. In other words, a public good is one that all
within the relevant public must enjoy more or less
equally, or none will enjoy the good at all.
Public goods generally are free goods as far as
markets are concerned because consumers cannot
(or cannot realistically) be excluded from enjoying
them. How much can one charge others for viewing
the blue sky over one’s property? The only costs, if
any, associated with a public good are the costs of
capture, transportation, and delivery, not a cost for
the good itself. This gives rise to important problems
in managing public goods. If you invest in developing
or improving the good, others, who invest or pay
nothing, will enjoy the benefits of your investment
because you cannot exclude others from enjoying
the good (Coase 1974). Such others are “free riders.”
Free riders can be a serious inhibition to investment
unless the government (or some other institution)
ensures that all (or nearly all) pay for the benefits
they receive.
For example, if left entirely to the market choices
of persons to buy cleaner running cars, others can
(and many would) decide to free ride on the efforts
of others to clean the air. As more people realize
that this possibility exists, fewer would voluntarily
buy a cleaner running car. After all, buying a cleaner
running car will have little effect on air quality. The
solution, of course, is to compel all to buy cleaner
running cars. Relying on the market simply won’t
work; relying on regulation will.
Water is not indivisible and public in the strictest
sense. We have all bought bottled water. Yet when
we are talking about raw water—water in bulk in
its natural state—transaction costs are simply so high
that no market can function with even minimal
effectiveness (Chakrvorty, Hochman, and Zilberman
1995; Howe, Boggs, and Butler 1990; Shelanski and
Klein 1995). Moreover, water is so essential to life
that all must receive a “fair” share of the resource.
Similarly, consider environmental needs, such as the
protection of instream flows (Gillilan and Brown
1997). Less obvious, but no less true, is the public
nature of water when withdrawn for private use. A
river is an ambient resource that can never be fully
controlled or fully owned. Even a dam only delays
the flow of the water; it cannot stop it altogether.
Thus doing something to water on a large scale
necessarily affects many others, making it difficult
to procure the contractual assent of all significantly
affected persons. Transaction costs on all but the
smallest streams, lakes, or aquifers, quickly become
prohibitive. This reality underlies the tradition of
treating water as a free good—a good available to
all at no cost for the water itself, but only for the
cost of capturing, transporting, and using the water.
Supporters of markets hardly mention the
transaction costs inherent in any attempt to treat
water as a private good. Economist Ronald Coase
has argued that analyses that ignore such basic
concerns as transaction costs are typical of the
“blackboard economics” indulged in by most
economists (Coase 1988, 1-20). Coase is criticizing
the most important and frequent simplifying
assumption most economists make in their analyses,
the assumption of a “frictionless market”—one
without transaction costs. Lawyers, on the other
hand, focus precisely on the costs and frictions of
the marketplace, for the lawyer’s role is to minimize,
accommodate, or overcome such problems (Schwab
1989). Lawyers, unlike economists, simply are not
concerned about how ideal markets would function—
except as a baseline for measuring the failures of
real markets.  The reality of transaction costs should
give even the most free-market oriented economist
pause to consider whether true markets could
function effectively for water resources. Those who
advocate recourse to private action as the prime
means for protecting instream values miss the point
entirely (Crammond 1996; Landry 1998; Sterne
1997).
Those who advocate the privatization of water
with its allocation and management to be
determined by markets are demanding an end to
our treatment of water as a free good. Water should
not be a free good any longer. Economic incentives
should be introduced for those who use water so
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they will more realistically evaluate the social
consequences of their conduct. Various economic
incentives, including fees, taxes, and “water banks,”
undoubtedly are useful in managing public property.
But resort to economic incentives should not
obscure the fact that water remains the prime
example of a public good for which prices cannot
be set in a marketplace.
Patterns of Property in Water
In thinking about “property” in water, one is likely
to have in mind a system of rules that define rights
and duties pertaining to water in clear and certain
terms, with law serving to protect the resulting
entitlements except insofar as the owners agree to
changes through market transactions. A close model
of such a system is the American law of
appropriative rights, although similar systems are
found in other countries as well (Dellapenna 2001).
On the other hand, a rule that permits anyone to use
a “common pool resource” so long as the use is
“reasonable” hardly seems like a property rule at
all, at least in the foregoing sense. Such a rule leaves
courts to sort out conflicting claims of right to the
common pool resource solely through the prohibition
of tortious interference with other users (Dellapenna
2001). This amounts to a rule of common property,
rather than a rule of private property, somewhat as
if tenants in common were to dispute the use of
land. The American law of riparian rights is the prime
example of such a legal regime, although the Roman
law of flowing water was similar. The third possibility
is active public management of the common
resource. The newest system of American law for
the allocation of surface water, “regulated
riparianism,” corresponds to such a public ownership
model (Dellapenna 2001).
While particular legal regimes often contain a mix
of two or all three of these systems, analyzing the
pure types makes clear their strengths and
weaknesses (Munzer 1990). Because water
allocation is mostly a matter of state law in the United
States, all three approaches are found here. The
correspondence between these forms of American
water law and the several theoretical models of
property enables us to predict with some certainty
whether the existing forms are adaptable to changing
circumstances, or whether an entirely new form
must be substituted when circumstances of water
demand or supply change dramatically. Treating
water as common property leads to tragic over
exploitation as soon as water begins to become
scarce. Therefore, a common property system
cannot survive. Markets also fail when one attempts
to treat the right to use water as private property.
As a result, private property systems like
appropriative rights are experiencing increasing
stress as demand surges and unappropriated water
becomes hard to find. What works best (albeit
imperfectly) is to treat water as inherently public
property for which basic allocation decisions must
be made by public agencies.
Why Common Property Systems
Cannot Survive
Under a common property system, each common
owner decides individually whether and how to
increase her use of the resource without regard to
the effect on other common owners (except for
direct interference with others’ uses). Each owner
is able to appropriate the whole of each additional
increment of use, while the whole group will share
equally the cost imposed on the common resource
(Rose 1991). Consider cows grazing on a common
pasture. For each additional cow I add to my herd,
I obtain the full benefit, but the common owners as
a group share the burden of the reduced carrying
capacity of the pasture. The only rational course is
to add the cow. At this point, since we have no
way of limiting each other, the only rational course
will be to add as many cows as possible in order to
grab as much of the resource as possible before
the resource is completely destroyed (Hardin 1968).
Thus the common property system not only fails to
protect the resource, it actually accelerates its
demise.
Economists have criticized this account as over
simplifying the reality of how “commons” functioned
in earlier times or in remote areas (McCay and
Acheson 1987). In many small communities,
commons have functioned satisfactorily over
extended periods through informally created and
enforced patterns of use. In larger societies, where
most persons are strangers to each other, informal
sanctions do not function effectively and formal law
recognizes no real limits on a person’s exploitation
of the commons (Harris 1995). We have witnessed
the resulting “tragedy of the commons” over and
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over again this century when the rule of common
property is not displaced by a different rule. Consider
fish in the sea, lobsters in Nova Scotia, national park
access, and even national treasuries (Dellapenna
2004; Fort and Baden 1981; M’Gonigle 1980; Sax
1980).
If exploitation of a common pool resource requires
significant capital investment, the inability of potential
investors to keep others from preempting an
investor’s use will cause under investment in the
resource (Rose 1986). Courts expressed precisely
this fear in rejecting riparian rights in the drier,
western states of the United States (Coffin v. Left-
Hand Ditch Co. 1882; Dellapenna 1991b, § 8.01).
A private property system, in which the costs as
well as the benefits of resource management
decisions are concentrated on the particular owner
making the decision, would appear to avoid the
tragedy of the commons. On the other hand, appeals
to moderation and similar forms of moral suasion
for managing the commons are self-defeating. Those
who respond to the appeal leave the field to other
common owners who continue to increase their own
exploitation of the resource to the point of exhaustion
(Hardin 1968). Heeding a moral appeal only reduce
one’s own gains with little or no benefit to the
common resource. In light of this, even many who
agreed with the appeal would not change their
behavior.
Why Private Property Systems Fail
for Water Resources
Private property is a system whereby resources
(tangible or intangible) are used or controlled by
particular persons. Private property systems, by
concentrating the costs and the rewards of resource
use on the owner, allow the owner to balance costs
against benefits to determine the most efficient use
of the resource. Generally, but not always, private
property systems are linked to markets systems for
the property in question. A private-property market
system is the best mechanism for allocating resources
when it works, but the system fails if there are
significant barriers to the functioning of a market
(Coase 1960). That markets for water as such have
never actually played a large role, even in a private-
property system like appropriative rights, suggests
that markets do not work well for ambient resources
like water.
When one user attempts to convey her water right
to another, particularly to one seeking to make a
completely different use of the water, the problem
of “externalities” arises. An externality arises when
a use by any person affects uses by others, and
hence significant change in any use infringes upon
the interests of the other users, perhaps all other
uses from the same source  (Posner 2003, § 3.7).
While theoretically it might be possible for a properly
structured market to cope with these concerns, in
any hydrologically large and complex system the
difficulty and expense of structuring the necessary
transactions (transaction costs) prevent markets
from developing unless the law chooses to disregard
the externalities (Schlag 1989).
Under appropriative rights, senior appropriators
(those whose appropriations began earlier in time)
have superior rights to junior appropriators. One might
think that the law would routinely ignore externalities
in appropriative rights states when the transfer is
undertaken by a senior appropriator since
externalities would affect only junior appropriators.
The law of appropriative rights, however, prohibits
a senior appropriator from changing the time, place,
or manner of use if the change would produce
significant injury to a junior appropriator (Gould 1988).
The burden of proving that there will be no injury to
other water users is on the party seeking to make
the change. If the evidence is inconclusive, a court
will prohibit the change. Such uncertainty is common
when the question is what portion of the water
diverted from the stream (the usual measure of the
appropriative right) was consumptively used by a
senior appropriator and what portion constituted a
return flow to the benefit of junior appropriators
(O’Brien and Gunning 1994).
A classic example is the Coors Beer case (City
of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co. 1972).
The Coors Beer Co. was unable to produce enough
beer to satisfy demand for its product without a
greatly enlarged supply of water. Denver is always
looking for new sources of potable water for its
residents and businesses. Denver and Coors agreed
to swap Coors’ “clear mountain stream” in exchange
for Coors receiving the right to unlimited quantities
of Denver sewage water for its brewery. The
transaction did not occur, not because of possible
outrage on the part of beer drinkers, but because
farmers downstream from Denver (organized as the
Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co.) obtained an injunction
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against it. The trade would have deprived the
farmers of the water on which they relied—even
though the farmers’ rights were junior to those of
Denver.
Appropriative rights law does not go as far as it
might to inhibit transfers of water to new uses. It
protects only the rights of other appropriators.
Generalized social costs, such as the loss of tax
revenues to a community, usually are not protected
from the effects of transfers (Gomez and Loh 1996;
Sax 1995). Concern over such generalized social
costs generated enough political pressure to bring
about “area-of-origin” statutes. Area-of-origin
statutes have not been significant barriers to market
transactions. The rights of junior appropriators are
sufficient deterrents to market transactions that it
really does not matter whether social costs are
ignored or considered.
Some who champion the free play of markets
insist that the protection of third-party rights results
from an overly rigid legal regime. If only such
requirements were removed, markets would flourish.
This mischaracterizes the situation. Area-of-origin
statutes have the potential to interfere with or to
prevent market transactions. The protection of third-
party rights operate differently. Such protections
prevent market-generated externalities from
destroying the property rights of third parties. Rather
than representing government intervention that
prevents or distorts markets, such protections are
the minimum necessary to assure that property
rights—each person’s property rights—are
transferred only through markets.
Because of the protection of third-party rights,
small-scale transfers of water rights among farmers
or ranchers—all of whom are making roughly similar
uses at similar locations—are the only ones that
regularly occur without heavy state intervention
(National Research Council 1992). As a result,
treating water as private property tends to freeze
patterns of use rather than to create a market. What
happens when the barriers are removed is shown
by, among other examples, the California water bank.
Removing Legal Barriers: The
California Water Bank
California, facing a five-year long drought in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, sought to transfer water
from low valued agricultural uses to higher valued
urban uses, not by replacing its largely private
property system with a common property system,
but by creating a “market” where none had existed
before (Gray 1995; Israel and Lund 1995; O’Brien
and Gunning 1994; Wahl 1995). To accomplish this
end, California created a “water bank” (Dellapenna
2001, ch. 6, § 6.01(b)(2)).1
The California Water Bank itself was small by
California standards, involving in its peak year (1992)
400,000 acre-feet (500 MCM) when the state’s
shortfall alone exceeded 6,000,000 acre-feet (7,400
MCM). The California Water Bank moreover was
a most unusual “market.” For the 350 persons who
were willing to sell water rights, the state was the
only buyer; for the 20 institutions willing to buy water
rights, the state was the only seller. California simply
decreed that when it (the state) buys or sells water
it need not concern itself with the effects of its
transactions on third parties, even if the affected
third parties hold valid water rights. The state set
the prices ($125/ac-ft. to sellers, as much as $400/
ac-ft. to buyers) administratively. The state sold to
buyers selected administratively on the basis of
criteria other than willingness to pay what the market
will bear.
Through the California Water Bank, the state used
economic incentives to encourage other actors to
comply with the state’s policy choices while
disregarding the effects of the state’s actions on
actors whose claims, if recognized, would preclude
accomplishment of the state’s goals (Gray 1995;
Wahl 1995). Flexibility was introduced to enable
fundamental transformation of water uses within the
state, and (incidentally) wealth is transferred from
those who formerly used water to those who
thereafter would use water (Carter, Vaux, and
Scuering 1994; Gray 1994; O’Brien and Gunning
1994). In California, as elsewhere were putative
markets have been introduced, the transfers of water
(and wealth) went from small (and relatively poor)
users to large (and relatively rich) users. There is,
however, considerable evidence that at least when
it comes to water, equity is more important than
efficiency (Howe 1996).
In California, a public management system
masqueraded as a market. The water bank used,
without being limited to, economic incentives as a
management tool (Gray 1994; Harris 1995). The
changes introduced through the California Water Bank
might very well represent a more rational use of the
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water (Zywicki 2003). What does not seem to be
addressed is whether the change is equitable. In any
event, the means used to achieve these goals did not
involve a market—and hardly had anything to do with
private property rights in water either. Nor did the
recent “sale” of water by the Imperial Irrigation
District to San Diego represent a market—the
Secretary of the Interior cut the District’s water
allocation by 15% and indicated that the District would
only recover its full allocation if it sold the 15% to San
Diego (Perry 2003). It is hard to see the “invisible
hand” of the market place at work in any of this.
The Public Property Option
Today, both eastern and western states in the
United States are increasingly turning to active public
management for surface water exploitation, for
surface drainage, and for groundwater (Dellapenna
2001; 2003). State governments have concluded that,
despite the considerable difficulties in defining the
proper public goals or in making the right decisions
to achieve those goals, a transition to public property
offers significant advantages over both common
property and private property in terms of efficiency
and distributive justice. This seems true for economic
values and for non-economic values.
The core concept of a public property system in
water is expressed in regulated riparian statutes
as the requirement that all uses qualifying for a
permit must be “reasonable” (Dellapenna 2001, §
9.03(b)). The factors for determining whether a
particular use is reasonable under such statutes are
virtually identical with the factors considered under
the reasonable use theory of traditional riparian
rights. The regulated riparian statutes, however,
provide a process whereby the decision whether a
proposed use is reasonable is made before
investment in the use through the issuance or denial
of a permit. The permit process fundamentally
transforms the operation of the “reasonableness”
concept from that under traditional riparian rights.
Such an ambitious program of public management
might very well fall short of the goals set for it. It
undoubtedly would be improved by the introduction
of various economic incentives as part of the public
management scheme (Cummings and Nercissiantz
1992). One should not confuse economic incentives
with markets (Coase 1960; Dellapenna 2000; Gray
1994).
Even with economic incentives, moving
fundamental decisions about private use of water
from the actors involved into the hands of experts
working in an administrative agency presents
daunting challenges. At the extreme, public choice
theorists would describe the transition to a public
property system as simply yet another form of rent
seeking by those who are powerful in government
yet not powerful (or at least not powerful enough)
in the marketplace (Farber and Frickey 1991;
Mashaw 1997). Certainly, the administration of a
public property system will be less than perfect.
Whether such a permit process is superior to
traditional riparian rights, to appropriative rights, to
a pure market system (if such were possible), or to
some other regulatory system has been, and
continues to be, hotly debated (Dellapenna 2001, §
9.03(a)(5)(D)). How one resolves the question
largely depends on how much confidence one has
in the ability of a bureaucratic structure to manage
a common pool resource compared to the
alternatives. Still, one cannot have much confidence
in a market system given the transaction costs and
externalities present as barriers to the successful
operation of a market for water rights.
The public managerial impulse, however, has
substantial monetary costs in terms of money and
the risk of poor decisions by the managers. Some of
these costs can be reduced by exempting from the
administrative process users who consume only
small quantities of water or who make low-valued
uses, but only by leaving out of the system uses that
in the aggregate can amount to a major portion of
total consumption (Dellapenna 2001, §§ 9.03(a)(1),
9.03(a)(3)). The occurrence of poor management
is more difficult to assess, in part because there is
considerable disagreement about what constitutes
good management. If one takes a purely economic
approach, almost any public management will appear
to be a waste if the hydrologic system generally
supplies a surplus to all foreseeable potential users
(Oates 1996; Posner 2003, § 3.11). Yet to others,
such policies will appear to be the management of a
major public resource in a socially responsible
manner, a manner that does not “surrender” to the
marketplace (Butler 1986). Still, there are serious
questions about whether experts at any administering
agency can realistically be expected to acquire the
information necessary to arrive at the right
conclusions (Lewis 1992). When one adds the
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unrepresentative nature of the bureaucratic process
and the tendency of an error to be magnified when
applied uniformly through a bureaucratic
mechanism, one might well wonder why public
management of water is now so popular in the United
States—at a time when “privatization” is sweeping
the United States and the world for so many other
resources.
The question is not, however, whether a public
property system creates an ideal model of water
allocation, but whether it creates a better model for
water allocation than is otherwise available. The
rarity of markets for water rights, coupled with the
deficiencies of either common property or private
property systems in water, suggests that the allocation
of water is not particularly efficient under those
models either, and that the loss in efficiency, if any,
from adopting a public property system is not likely
to be high, and might well prove to be a gain.
Furthermore, our experience with public
management of oil and gas production—through
compulsory pooling and managed rates of
withdrawal—suggests that such a system can work
for water, at least when it comes to conservation
and equitable sharing.
As this brief discussion suggests, there is no
entirely conclusive answer to whether a public
property system is worth its cost, or whether a private
property system with “enhanced” markets would
work better or at less cost (Komesar 1994). In the
end, one must make a judgment based on one’s
reading of the evidence at hand. The actual
experience with water markets suggests that they
cannot be made to work except through dumping
great externalities on water users not involved in a
particular transaction. But if markets are not
workable, one is left with few options other than to
attempt to make a public property system work
efficiently and equitably.
If one accepts that public management is the
preferable way to manage water in the future, one
then must design the necessary institutions. This is
no easy task. One model of how this could be done
is found the Regulated Riparian Model Water
Code, adopted by the American Society of Civil
Engineers as an official standard of the Association
in 2003 (Dellapenna 2003).
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Notes
1. One must be careful in discussing “water banks” as the
term is used in the United States in several inconsistent
senses.
